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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
A number of specific benefits that fit within the hallmarks 
of effective development are realized with implementation of 
model-based approaches to systems and assurance.  Model 
Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) enabled by standardized 
modeling languages (e.g., SysML®) is at the core.   
These benefits in the context of spaceflight system 
challenges can include [1]:  
• Improved management of complex development 
• Reduced risk in the development process 
• Improved cost management 
• Improved design decisions 
With appropriate modeling techniques the assurance 
community can improve early oversight and insight into project 
development.  NASA has shown the basic constructs of SysML 
in an MBSE environment offer several key advantages, within 
a Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA) initiative [2, 3].  
These include the following: 
• Model viewpoints that promote rapid and systematic 
assessment of requirements coverage, hazard tagging and 
risk management 
• Embedded safety assessments for launch vehicles 
• Deployment of model assisted development of reliability 
products - Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEAs) 
and Fault Trees 
• Test Planning 
• Validation and Verification of complex functions 
• Support of Assurance Case development for complex 
systems 
In addition, while there are benefits, there is a realization 
that these do not come without effort and cost.  Enabling model-
based approaches requires structure, not only in an 
organizational context, but in a modeling context as well.  There 
can be a steep learning curve and costs associated to train 
skilled modelers.  But, on the other hand, not all of the 
assurance community need to be modelers.  Models themselves 
must conform to ontologies that enable assurance.  This places 
constraints upon the models and modelers.  Optimums have yet 
to be developed where resources and constraints on modeling 
must be traded off in the organization and modeling efforts for 
projects.    
A number of barriers need to be overcome, as well, which 
pose challenges to the developers of the software that supports 
MBSE/MBMA.  Information and data must be made to flow 
seamlessly through the life cycle.  Because there is a wide 
variety of tools used in the community, to avoid the problems 
of the past of silos, delays, and diverging interests, information 
should flow among these tools to support the “single source of 
truth” paradigm of MBSE.  This will greatly facilitate MBMA 
and advancement of assurance functions. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Model Based Engineering (MBE) is emerging in the 
aerospace sector as an important contributor to improved 
development from concept to production.  Indeed, Model Based 
Systems Engineering (MBSE) is leading the way in moving 
from a document centric development process to the digitally 
enabled modeling environment.  In NASA, selected major 
projects have moved forward with MSBE enabled 
development.  Examples include NASA's Europa Clipper 
project led by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in which 
systems modeling effort has been at the forefront from the 
beginning, and NASA's Orion in which modeling has enabled 
more effective development of the guidance and navigation 
(GN&C) software [1, 4].  These examples are relevant as they 
define the state of the art in implementation of model based 
concepts. 
Europa Clipper is a major interplanetary exploration 
project with an anticipated launch date in 2023.  It will take on 
exploring Jupiter’s icy moon Europa, for which it was named.  
The implementation of MBSE on the project has centered on 
the implementation of SysML models, with viewpoints that 
enable systems engineers on the project to manage mass and 
power margins, track and trace requirements, and oversee the 
conceptual development.  The benefits and value added to the 
project have recently been evaluated by Bayer [1].  In this case, 
benefit to system assurance is realized by improved 
management of requirements, better communication across the 
project, and a single source of truth implementation to drive 
analysis, thereby reducing errors.  An implementation of auto 
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generated fault trees is being used and results checked against 
conventional fault trees being developed for the mission’s 
probabilistic risk analysis (PRA).    
Orion is NASA’s crewed flagship system for the upcoming 
Moon and Mars missions.  The guidance and navigation system 
(GN&C) is crucial to the success of its deep space mission 
scenarios and its software is the heart of this system.  While this 
success may not have utilized SysML at the top level, Orion 
GN&C clearly reflects the utility of modeling in system 
development.  In this case, Simulink® provided a basis for a 
model driven development of the flight software [4].  GN&C 
algorithms were developed and tested, and autocoding 
produced the flight software products.  The successful test of 
the Orion in EFT-1 showed the overall success of this 
development [5].  Clearly, system assurance benefits from the 
lower error rates in code that emerges from this type of effort. 
With each success and demonstrated benefit MBE 
continues to gain a foothold across NASA, as new and ever-
increasing complexity emerges.   With progression, assurance 
can gain greater and more direct benefits from the modeling 
environment [2].   The authors have previously discussed these 
anticipated benefits, many of which have been demonstrated on 
a smaller programmatic scale [2, 3].  These include synthesis of 
assurance products and views of the system from SysML, such 
as failure modes and effects analysis, fault trees and reliability 
block diagrams for analytical purposes, as well as fault 
diagrams, and Bayesian nets [3].  Further development across 
the agency and continuing applications have poised the 
assurance fields for greater advancement, as discussed below. 
2 ENGAGING THE ENTERPRISE 
In recognizing the potential benefits of MBMA, it can be 
quickly seen that success depends upon a System of Systems 
(SoS) solution within the enterprise, in order to realize products 
and demonstrated benefits.  Concurrent with MBMA at NASA, 
the systems engineering community emerged with a program to 
explore MBSE beyond that experienced within Europa and 
Orion.  This provided a natural partnership for MBMA 
development. 
Figure 1.  Systems Vee overlaid with assurance products for safety and reliability. 
2.1 Cross Life Cycle Modeling Team 
NASA's Pathfinder endeavor provided a natural 
partnership for the NASA assurance community to develop 
MBMA concepts [6,7].  Multiple Pathfinder projects allowed 
for testing ideas, development of views and viewpoints, and 
engaging the model for safety and reliability products and 
analyses.   
Pathfinder evolved to become the Model Based Systems 
Engineering (MBSE) Infusion and Modernization Initiative 
(MIAMI).  This program has focused on expanding modeling 
capabilities across the life cycle of NASA systems using 
sounding rocket missions as the basis [8].  Sounding rocket 
missions afford a life cycle in which MBSE and MBMA 
benefits can be demonstrated to the enterprise in a relatively 
short timeframe as compared to larger scale missions.   The 
projects have been driven by the Cross Life Modeling (CLM) 
team with membership across the agency.   
The objectives of the team were well delineated by 
Waldram et.  al.  [8]: 
“1) Develop useful, innovative Model Based Systems 
Engineering (MBSE) approaches to successfully advance and 
achieve Sounding Rocket and Experiment Missions and  
2) Provide a cornerstone of MBSE approaches (e.g., 
deployment of structure, behavior, requirement, and parametric 
models, libraries, templates, patterns, configuration 
management) that will be used as a best practice for the MBSE 
[and MBMA] practitioner.” 
Among the successes have been the development of 
viewpoints to engage non-expert modelers with the model, 
which is highly useful to the assurance community, and the 
infusion of safety requirements for launches directly into the 
model.  These are explained in more detail below. 
2.2 Assurance Across the Life Cycle 
In the earliest stages of the program, requirements are 
developed and flowed down to subsystems.  At this stage, 
assurance can receive the benefits of MBSE by working directly 
with the development of the requirements, which provides early 
access to project development.  As the model emerges with the 
design, appropriately scoped views can provide oversight at the 
earliest stages of development. 
An effective SoS solution at the enterprise level for MBE 
will involve integration of a variety of software tools to meet 
stakeholder needs at various stages of the life cycle [10].  
Assurance tools in fact vary widely depending upon their 
purpose and the products needed at the appropriate point the life 
cycle.  Figure 1 shows some safety and reliability artifacts that 
are needed in the design of systems, overlaid on the systems vee 
(SE-V) [??107].  Various software tools support these analyses.  
The benefits of the system model in producing these analyses is 
realized when the information from the systems model can be 
exploited by other tools, or if the analysis can be directly 
extracted from the systems model by specialized scripts or plug-
ins.  In the latter case, the fidelity of the artifacts will depend on 
the level of the model. 
As an example, early Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) can be extracted directly from SysML models, given a 
correct ontology.  Details within the model supporting design 
trade decisions and an early understanding of off nominal 
behavior and failure can then be derived [8].  Similarly, Fault 
Trees can be synthesized rapidly, along with block diagrams.  
However, as details emerge in the design of hardware or 
software, other tools may be more useful [9].  In this case, early 
products may serve as precursors to more detailed analyses for 
which structural information needs to move from SysML into 
other tools in the modeling environment.  A significant lesson 
herein is that data must flow through the SE-V rapidly and 
seamlessly to take full advantage of MBE.  This presents 
challenges in the solutions space that are not easily solved when 
there are multiple stakeholders requiring the use of different 
modeling tools. 
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) based assurance or safety 
cases are highly compatible with MBE and can be folded into 
the modeling environment.  The Assurance or Safety Case then 
supports maintaining a machine-readable logic structure that 
serves as a record of assurance decisions affecting the design, 
while rolling up in the digital format, products and analysis that 
support design, testing and operations from a safety and 
reliability viewpoint.  The utility of the assurance on small 
missions has been shown by Austin et.  al. [9] focusing on 
radiation assurance for a cubesat mission.  Assurance and 
Safety Cases can serve a significant benefit and represent a type 
of model that is the assurance perspective of the “single source 
of truth” for oversight and reviews as well as for risk acceptance 
prior to deployment of the system. 
3 ASSURANCE VIEWS AND ASSURANCE PRODUCTS 
The ability to develop model views from multiple 
stakeholders is an essential characteristic of the modeling 
environment [12].   This must be a priority in the enterprise 
solution of MBE to enable assurance and other stakeholders to 
interact with the modeling environment.  This is part of the 
notion of the SysML specification [13].   We often describe the 
model as an N-dimensional being, and the views give us 2- (or 
3-) dimensional slices of the higher dimensional object.   This 
is similar to what we were doing with all of the documents of 
yesteryear, but in the current case there are no inconsistencies 
since all stakeholders share the same data.    
Another important aspect of Views and Viewpoints is the 
ability to make ‘standard’ Views and Viewpoints, which 
contain selected information of interest to particular 
stakeholder(s).  The promise of having standardized insight into 
a standardized model has an overwhelming allure.   This 
promise usually requires (among other things) that some 
portion of the pattern for modeling be standardized.   This can 
be more easily illustrated using Figure 2 below.   A Document 
(e.g., Some Standard Document in the Figure) consists of a 
collection of Views (e.g., Introduction and Model Overview).   
Each View must ‘conform’ to a Viewpoint and ‘expose’ one or 
more packages.   The Viewpoint contains ‘methods’ or ways of 
constructing the View and usually involves Collection of 
objects, Filtering of objects, Sorting of objects and 
representation of Object attributes.    The package(s) exposed 
contain the objects to be collected, filtered, sorted and 
displayed.   If the method is looking for ‘stereotypes’ of a 
certain name, then the model needs to be using the pattern of 
stereotypes with the naming convention expected.   There are 
more robust ways of gathering information, but there will 
always be some degree of conformance required. 
3.1 Views from Assurance Stakeholder Viewpoints 
The benefits of modeling from an assurance perspective are 
derived from interacting with the model to access information 
or to impact the development of the system.  Oversight 
functions to facilitate independence of technical authority, for 
example, require the appropriate stakeholder viewpoint that is 
more global in nature to explore the state of the project.  A 
model view emerges, which allows for evaluating requirements, 
hazards, and risks early in the life cycle.  Other views may be 
more focused on specific aspects of safety to automatically 
ensure compliance.   A launch system Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS), for example, would embed range safety 
requirements into mission planning. 
Figure 2.  SysML diagram for views from stakeholder viewpoints. 
Figure 3.  A simplified modeling pattern for Hazard tags.  Activities in this context are well defined safety procedures.  
A key aspect of the MIAMI/MBMA collaboration 
described earlier is the emphasis on the two thrusts that reflect 
assurance stakeholder needs: 
Thrust 1: Representing safety, reliability and quality for 
hardware and software in SysML (to the extent practical) 
Thrust 2: Lowering the ‘barrier to entry’ for model 
interaction and review for assurance stakeholders who are not 
expert modelers (to the extent practical) 
The MIAMI/MBMA Thrust 1 effort represented key 
notions such as Requirements, Environments, Hazards, Risks 
and Procedures in a SysML model.   One example is shown in 
Figure 3.   Note, that this seemingly simple pattern enables us 
to do something rather efficient.   When an informed 
stakeholder determines that a particular Hazard is present, the 
linkage to the Requirements governing the Processes and 
Procedures is automatically present.   This powerful pattern 
means that the act of allocating a Hazard to a System Element 
also attaches all of the procedures and traceability to associated 
requirements.   Un-allocating removes all of them.   They can 
be changed and managed in one place, and used in many.  
Implementation of such patterns is an essential aspect of 
enabling the assurance stakeholders in a community where 
resources are scare and time is at a premium.  But this requires 
engagement of expert modelers and cooperative systems 
engineering and assurance efforts. 
3.2 Integration of Range Safety: A Specific Model View 
In the case of Thrust 2 type collaboration within MIAMI, a 
range safety and CONOPS view was developed with unique 
features for visualization of safety requirement compliance.  
The SysML modeling fragments and visualization are shown in 
Figure 4.  A vehicle is automatically selected and launch paths 
calculated given the mass of the payload.  Trajectories are 
bounded and overlaid on Google Earth to show compliance 
with range safety.  This view integrates planning and safety 
compliance in the very early stages of the lifecycle.  Assurance 
is embedded and expert modelers are not needed to exercise the 
view and visualization. 
Figure 4.  SysML model fragments reflecting integration of range safety requirements implemented in a view with range 
visualization showing trajectory data based on sounding rocket characteristics (courtesy WFF-CLM Team contribution) 
4 ASSURANCE ANALYSIS IN MBSE 
Modeling can also enable a variety of assurance artifacts to 
be automatically produced and used as appropriate in the life 
cycle.  The earliest benefits may be yielded in reliability and 
maintainability [2].  Several papers have been published by 
NASA modeling team reflecting the benefits and products [3, 
9, 10] including those from the authors.   
Generally, there are two ways to accomplish the task of 
producing reliability artifacts.  One approach is to extract the 
FMEA or FTA from a SysML structure model, given the model 
is assembled to do so.  In this case, state machines, a standard 
SysML behavior model, become very useful and plugins can be 
set up to traverse the model to evaluate effects.  A second 
approach is to export the SysML structure model to a secondary 
tool, such as a PLM driven tool, and perform the analyses there.  
This can be useful for detailed FMEAs particularly when 
canned libraries can be accessed for well-defined components.  
One such output is reflected in Figure 5.  However, limited data 
flows between tools often makes this difficult, thereby 
illustrating a key challenge to full MBE implementation. 
5 STATUS\ 
Evidence of benefits to assurance from its alignment with 
Model Based Systems Engineering are accumulating, as seen in 
major NASA projects.  Collaborative efforts between systems 
engineering and assurance have been underway to expand the 
scope of such benefits.  In particular, studies of sounding rocked 
missions, with their shorted lifecycles, have provided 
opportunities to explore innovative approaches.  These studies 
have begun to address ways to allow assurance personnel to 
interact with assurance-related model information without the 
need to become expert modelers themselves.  In parallel, work 
continues to expand the range of assurance artifacts whose 
production benefits from access to MBSE information.  A key 
challenge that remains is the need to ensure ease of information 
exchange between the multiple tools used by engineering and 
assurance. 
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Figure 5.  Auto fault tree from PLM tool.  (courtesy GSFC). 
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